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INTRODUCTION by Walter W. Hays, United States Geological Survey 
Decisionmakers have different perspectives about geologic hazards than 
scientists and engineers. 2 These differences, which have been summarized by Szanton ( 1981, table 3-1) , are the reasons that implementation of loss reduction 
measures are difficult. The differences are: 
o The ultimate objective of the decisionmaker is the aeproval of the 
electorate; it is the respect of peers for the scientist/engineer, 
o The time horizon for the decisionmaker is short; it is long for the 
scientist /engineer, 
o The focus of the decisionmaker is on the external logic of the problem; 
it is on the internal logic for the scientist/engineer, 
o The mode of thought for the decisionmaker is deductive and particular; 
it is inductive and generic for the scientist/engineer, 
o The most valued outcome for the decisionmaker is a reliable solution; it 
is original insight for the scientist/engineer, 
o The mode of expression is simple and absolute for the decisionmaker; it 
is abstruse and qualified for the scientist/engineer, and 
o The preferred form of conclusion for the decisionmaker is one of "best 
solution" with uncertainties submerged; it is multiple possibilities With 
uncertainties emphasized for the scientist/engineer. 
With these principles in mind, let us now turn the clock forward to the year 2000 
and a discussion between a decisionmaker and a scientist as they seek to resolve 
their philosophical differences and reach solutions to problems of earthquake-
hazards reduction. 
I Transcribed, condensed, and edited from audiotapes. 
2 Szanton, Peter, 1981, Not well advised: Russell Sage Foundation and The Ford 
Foundation, New York, 173 p. 
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Richard Andrews: I became involved in the earthquake business about four-and-
one-half years ago. Literally the first day I worked in this business after 14 years 
as a professor of history, I attended a cocktail party that was held in West Los 
Angeles where a number of people were gathered to inaugurate the beginning of an 
earthquake task force in the state of California. A comely young lady came up to 
me and said, "You realize, of course, that earthquakes are Mother Nature's way of 
crying out for love." Having dismissed that comment, I thought we had made 
considerable progress in earthquake-hazards reduction efforts here in California 
during the past four-and-one-half years. However, in the aftermath of the 1985 
Mexico earthquake, many emergency services workers here became subjects of 
great media attention. One Friday afternoon, a colleague and I had the pleasure of 
appearing on a mid-afternoon television talk show before a live audience. We were 
last on the program, following Prince and Michael Jackson look-alikes, Melissa 
Manchester, Redd Foxx, and a break-dancing act. We then had the pleasure of 
telling the audience about all the death and destruction facing southern California 
in a major earthquake. It was then that I thought back to the young woman's 
comment at the cocktail party, and wondered if we truly had made any progress in 
the past four-and-one-half years. 
What I would like to do very briefly is to provide an overview of where we are 
and where we might be going in this business that we're collectively involved with. 
I returned recently from Mexico City. One of the major lessons I came away with 
from that experience was that the problems the Mexican government and people 
encountered in that tragic series of events were compounded by the difficulty of 
various systems of government and various disciplines knowing how to talk to one 
another. In some cases it was literally the problem of physically not being able to 
talk to each other, but more importantly it was a problem of really not knowing 
what the other one was saying. I think conferences like this workshop are very 
important to bridge that gap so that we do learn to talk to one another. As Bill 
Medigovich, the director of California Office of Emergency Services, said this 
morning in his opening comments, we need mutual respect among the disciplines. 
There is need for an early dialogue in which the users of geotechnical information 
help define what the information needs to be. 
In California, the fundamental problem we face is simply the issue of time. 
All of the discussions that we've had today could be much more informed if we 
knew what time frame we were talking about. How quickly do we need to apply 
the information that we have? Do we have five years, five days, or five hours 
before an event occurs here that is on the scale we have talked about. In the 
absence of that basic knowledge, we are left with a high degree of uncertainty that 
causes much impatience. Those of use who are involved in the policy side or the 
emergency response side of earthquake hazards reduction get very impatient with 
some of the debates that go on. In part that impatience is the consequence of two 
different systems -- the academic research system colliding with people who are 
involved in emergency response and in direct life-saving activities. 
It's important to recognize that we have made great advances, particularly in 
awareness. If the big earthquake happens tommorrow, there will be fewer people 
in southern California surprised that it happened than would have been surprised 
four-and-one-half years ago. I think we have convinced people that this is 
inevitable in our future, but beyond that again the question is time. 
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Unquestionably, the research that has been carried on over the last decade has 
helped narrow that focus of time, but we are still left with a high degree of 
uncertainty. In California there have been unprecedented levels of commitment to 
the earthquake program. Just in the last 15 months, Governor Deukmejian has 
signed legislation appropriating over 2.5 million dollars for previously non-existent 
programs in the area of seismic safety. It's clear that there is a commitment by 
both the Governor and the Legislature to seismic safety. If I was asked what would 
have the greatest impact in the short run for managing an earthquake disaster in 
California, I think it is the emergency response phase. After reviewing the events 
in Mexico City, I don't care how good a communications system we have or how 
rapidly we respond. If we have thousands of people trapped in large buildings, no 
matter how effective our search and rescue efforts are, we are not going to save a 
lot of those people. In the long run, the way we're going to save people is through 
building safe structures. We know how to build earthquake-resistant buildings. The 
question is simply: who should do it and who should pay for it? Once we resolve 
these problems, we'll be along the way towards creating an earthquake-resistant 
environment. 
A little bit about earthquake prediction. The only way we're going to make 
advances in earthquake prediction is to continue the dialogue we're undertaking 
here today. We must learn how to understand and to have mutual respect for one 
another. I think for the scientific community there is a tremendous challenge in 
learning how to deal in the public arena, and learning how to deal with real-time 
geology and real-time seismology. It's a very different situation than dealing with 
the research laboratory or dealing with scientific exchanges with colleagues. 
We've made some progress in that area, but we need to learn from every 
experience that comes along, from things like the Parkfield prediction and from 
the San Diego earthquake-warning experience we had in June, 1985. In spite of all 
the denials by scientists that we can predict earthquakes, I walk in on a Tuesday 
and someone hands me a paper and says, "Guess what, the USGS thinks there's an 
increased probability that over the next five days there may be an earthquake of 
damaging potential in the San Diego area." At that point, all the probabilistic 
statements go out the window and you're forced to deal with a real situation. It was 
in part only because of the relationship that had been established between the 
emergency managers in California and the scientific community that we were able 
to work our way through. 
I think we need to continue to talk to each other, I think, though, we do need 
to change the order. It's not simply that we are the users of the this information, I 
think we are also the ones who need to define the direction to go. After all, the 
name of the program is "The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program" not the 
earthquake research program. The name of the game is saving lives, not simply 
doing eloquent papers. 
Clarence Allen: I am going to try to hit two topics in the next few minutes. First 
of all, where are we likely to be in the year 2000 in terms of the scientific effort in 
earthquake hazards reduction, and secondly, what are the difficulties and the 
frustrations that we have as scientists in our interactions with users? One thing 
that impresses me is that the year 2000 is not very far away. It's only 15 years; I 
might still be here. If we had asked, "What might be the status of hazard reduction 
in I 00 years?" it would be much easier to answer. I could then wave my arms about 
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prevention and control and all sorts of intriguing possibilities, but for the next 15 
years, I think we're forced to be somewhat more realistic and more practical in 
what we think might actually happen in that relatively short time period. 
Let's look back 15 years and see what the next 15 might hold in store. Where 
were we in 1970? Well, partly because of the fact that the 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake hadn't yet happened, I think there was far less general concern among 
the populace in the United States than there is today about earthquake hazards. 
The 1964 Alaskan earthquake had indeed been a major disaster, but somehow that 
didn't come as close to home as an earthquake in a metropolitan area such as Los 
Angeles. 
In 1970, interest in this country was increasing in the field of earthquake 
prediction. Some very intriguing results had come out of Russia that were well 
known at that time. Many of you will remember the Vp/Vs controversy. I think it's 
safe to say that we were just beginning to get a real interest in earthquake 
prediction, but that it wasn't yet a major scientific effort. The USGS professional 
paper on the 1968 Borrego Mountain earthquake was in preparation in 1970, and one 
very significant chapter by Malcolm Clark and others described a trench 
excavation across the Coyote Creek fault that was used to infer slip rates and, 
under certain assumptions, recurrence intervals of earthquakes. 
In 1970 the communication between scientists and engineers, and with the 
user groups, was minimal as compared to what we have today. A meeting such as 
this workshop was almost unheard of at that time. A lot has happened in the 15 
years since 1970, and I see no particular reason why the next 15 years should not be 
equally productive. A lot more people are working on the problem than there were 
15 years ago, including many from industry. Indeed many of the most significant 
fundamental contributions to our scientific understanding of earthquakes and 
hazard evaluation have come from people in the consulting geotechnical and 
engineering communities. Moreover, earth scientists are working together with the 
engineers far better today than we were at that time. 
Where are we going to be in the year 2000, only 15 years down the line? I 
think that we're going to find that earthquake prediction in the medium- or short-
term sense -- which is really what the term "prediction" means to the public -- will 
not be a routine procedure by the year 2000. We hope we will have made major 
progress, but I simply don't visualize that we will be routinely predicting damaging 
earthquakes by that time. 
By the year 2000, another Parkfield earthquake should have occurred. I think 
the whole future of the prediction research program is going to depend to a 
significant degree on what happens at Parkfield. A very major effort is being made 
there. We will have very good instrumentation in that area and I think that the 
experiment is going to be critical. If the earthquake is really preceded by 
precursors -- even if they're recognized only in retrospect -- a very significant 
boost to the earthquake prediction program will occur. However, if the earthquake 
is not preceded by physical precursors, which is certainly a real possibility, we may 
instead be turning a greater proportion of our effort toward hazard evaluation. So, 
I would emphasize that the Parkfield experiment is very critical, and we must be 
very honest in our evaluation of it. If the earthquake occurs, and we in fact see no 
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physical precursors, I think we will have to reconsider the possibilities of realistic 
predictions in other earthquake-prone areas during the coming years. 
I think we're going to find by the year 2000 that geodetic measurements are 
of greatly increased importance, not only in terms of possible prediction, but in 
terms of hazard evaluation. The implementation of new systems such as the Global 
Positioning Satellite (GPS) is going to revolutionize geodesy. We'll have a much 
better idea 15 years from now of what kinds of deformation are taking place within 
the State, not only short-term deformations that might be precursory to individual 
earthquakes, but long-term deformations that might be telling us what parts of the 
State are the most dangerous in terms of strain that is slowly building up. I think 
we are going to find that geodetic measurements will be a more important part of 
our scientific program than they are now, largely because of improvements in 
instrumentation. 
Furthermore, I think we're going to find, as we've already seen in the last two 
or three years, an increased reliance on probabilistic approaches, and not just those 
that depend on a and b values from historic earthquakes. These probabilistic 
approaches will depend-very heavily on other kinds of relevant data such as 
geologic deformation rates and paleoseismicity. Paleoseismicity studies will have 
multiplied manyfold, and maybe by that time we'll even understand why the 1886 
Charleston, South Carolina, earthquake occurred. By the year 2000, further 
disastrous earthquakes will have hit the United States. Although probably the 
"biggie" on the San Andreas will not have occurred yet, we can say that two or 
three magnitude 6 or 6-plus earthquakes will probably have occurred in the 
southern California region; and one or two of those probably will have occurred in 
the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, or San Diego. I also predict 
that at least one or two of these earthquakes will come as a complete surprise to 
the geologists and the geophysicists and will have occurred in an unexpected place, 
at an unexpected time, and in an unexpected way -- in somewhat the same manner 
as the 1984 Coalinga earthquake surprised us. 
Let me turn now to some of the problems that we as scientists face in 
interacting with the users. One of these is the rather surprising speed with which 
the disaster preparation people have leapt upon the possibility of earthquake 
prediction, even though the scientists are still far away from that ultimate 
objective. Now I appreciate that we as scientists have to bear some of the guilt. 
Perhaps we oversold the program to you people. Yet, we are surprised that people 
are gearing up to respond to an earthquake prediction when we're really not very 
close to making realistic scientific earthquake predictions in most areas. Secondly, 
I think we're a bit frustrated at the willingness and even the eagerness of the 
public, the press, and even some government agencies to accept alleged earthquake 
predictions from some questionable sources. Again, we're not without gui It in our 
dealings with the news media and with the public, but this is an area where we feel 
very uneasy and a have certain sense of frustration. Thirdly, I think we're a bit 
unhappy with the lack of understanding or even sympathy towards probabilistic 
kinds of statements. I remember several years ago a dam owner telling me: "Don't 
give me all this nonsense about 'probabilities and acceptable risk', just tell me 
whether the dam is safe or not." Well, I wish that the world were that simple. I 
think the increasing trend towards probabilistic approaches is indeed very valuable, 
although Dick Andrews might disagree with this. 
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Another area of frustration for us, to be very blunt, is the absence of 
stability in the disaster preparation agencies, which seem to be political footballs 
whose ranking people come and go with the tides of political change. I'm not sure 
any of us know the answer to that problem, but trying to deal with the rapid 
turnover in governmental agencies certainly has been an area of some frustration. 
Fifthly, and I suspect Dick Andrews would agree with this, is the lack of 
response from the community despite our repeated warnings. Just how many times 
do we have to repeat that the San Andreas is capable of a large earthquake? I've 
lived here since 1930, and I've heard this statement repeatedly since that time, yet 
we still have people saying, "Oh, the San Andreas is a dangerous fault? Why didn't 
you tell us?" 
Finally, I'd like to close with a question for Dick Andrews. For those of us in 
the scientific community, it's really not completely clear what type of scientific 
information on earthquake hazards is of the greatest use to the public. Let me just 
ask this question. The newly published USGS Professional Paper 1360 speaks of a 
magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault as being of serious 
concern to the Los Angeles area. Dick, which would be more valuable to the user 
community: a valid prediction of a magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the Newport-
lnglewood fault at a specific place next week, or a valid probabilistic statement of 
its likely occurrence during the next 50 years? Those two scenarios aren't 
necessarily mutually exclusive, but to some degree they represent different 
avenues of our research. 
Andrews: Being one of those short-time political people from a disaster 
preparedness agency, I'll ask for the short-term prediction! 
I think that Clarence has raised many good points. The year 2000 is not very 
far away and to acomplish anything in the way of significant hazard reduction in 
southern California, or in the state of California, or even across the United States 
we're going to have to inaugurate additional programs now. I think the whole issue 
of probabilistic statements for expressing earthquake potential to the public is one 
that we need to approach through trial and error. In the San Diego experience, the 
final public announcement said that one in 20 sequences like the one that occurred 
the night before have resulted in a damaging earthquake. We thought this was a 
marvelous way of getting around the uncertainty of saying 5 percent -- 5 percent 
of what? Then we had a session in San Diego with the various people there who 
were involved with the issuance of the prediction and one man from the media said 
"Who ever came up with that stupid idea saying one in 20 historical incidences? 
Why didn't you say 5 percent? Everybody understands that." The whole issue of 
how the statements that we make to the public are expressed is one we really need 
to approach carefully. 
One of the things I think is most frustrating for people involved in public 
agencies at any level is the difficulty of having to choose among the experts at a 
time when the decision needs to be made. It is frustrating to poll seven or eight 
seismologists and to get different opinions about what may be going on. I think the 
scientists need to recognize that they are dealing in a public arena with something 
that is of much greater consequence than simply the respect of their colleagues: 
namely the life and safety of the people of California. We need to be closely 
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coordinated on any kind of future predictions that are made. It's just not good to 
have one group of scientists saying that "Yes, it is going to happen with this kind of 
probability" and to have three or four other scientists quoted the same day in the 
paper disputing this conclusion •. I think that undermines the entire effort that 
we're involved in. 
Over the next 15 years I think the major thing we need to pay attention to, in 
addition to improving our response capability, is dealing with the thousands of 
hazardous structures we have in California. We need to develop a cost effective 
way to begin to retrofit these and we need to begin to recognize that it is 
fundamentally a political problem, not a technical problem, that we are dealing 
with. We clearly have enough information to significantly reduce the earthquake 
hazard here in California. Scientists need to recognize that their responsibility 
doesn't simply end with doing research, but that they need to participate in 
providing testimony to legislatures and they need to speak with a clear voice. I 
know that this goes against the grain in many ways of what the academic and 
research community is all about, but for too long some members of the earthquake 
research community have enjoyed being prophets without honor. They enjoy sitting 
in their rooms and saying, "Nobody pays attention to us and we really know what to 
do." Instead they need to be exposed to the light of day or to the glare of 
television cameras. I would emphasize that we need to go forward together in this 
enterprise. Clarence Allen pointed to the frustrations with regard to disaster 
preparedness and the fact that emergency managers have grabbed onto earthquake 
prediction. We're guilty of some of that, but from the public safety standpoint, 
earthquake prediction is not a research activity but an operational reality. We 
need to approach it from that standpoint and go forward together. 
Allen: Oick, one of your charges is that the scientists don't have their act 
together and that various people are saying different things to the detriment of the 
rest of the community; certainly this has sometimes been true. I might point out 
that the people in academia have an advantage over those in government. 
Whenever somebody in government speaks at almost any level, the public somehow 
assumes that that person is speaking for the government. Everyone knows, 
however, that when a professor speaks, he's not representing anybody, and this has 
led to a certain amount of irresponsibility on the part of people in academia 
making statements, as I emphasized in my presidential address to the Seismological 
Society of America in 1975. Earthquake prediction represents a very special area, 
and if one wants to stick his or her neck out, then he or she then has an obligation 
to defend himself or herself in public. It's quite different from other scientific 
endeavors. Nevertheless, earthquake prediction is still in a research phase. No one 
in the world claims to have an earthquake prediction scheme that's operational and 
reliable. Thus, it's inevitable that scientists are going to have different opinions 
and, in our society, we think that's good. That's the way progress is made: by 
competing opinions, theories, and hypotheses. 
Let me ask you this, do you think the Jdpanese have their act together better 
in the Tokai prediction than we do, and should we try to emulate them? 
Andrews: Yes, I think they do. In the Tokai area they have a special situation in 
some ways comparable to Parkfield. They have identified what they think will be 
the site of a large earthquake and precursors that will only be manifested in the 
43 
short term before the event. 'Nhether in fact that will happen or not, we don't 
know yet. But in terms of organizing and managing the earthquake prediction 
effort, I think they do have their act together. It is impressive to travel around 
Japan and talk to people who are involved in the prediction program. They all 
seem to understand how it is supposed to work if they begin to get anomalous 
behavior indicated on the instruments. In contrast, I think that if we went around 
this room and asked people to explain the functions of the National and the 
California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Councils, fewer than 50 percent of the 
people could provide a very clear answer as to what their roles should be. 
Allen: Let me give a somewhat less optimistic point of view on the Japanese 
effort. In the first place, we have to recognize that the Japanese are putting much 
more money into earthquake problems than we are. Clearly, the problem is more 
important in Japan than in the United States. 8ut I think the Japanese scientists 
may be sticking their necks out a bit too far in the case of the Tokai prediction. 
They've identified only one area for an impending earthquake, and this is where 
virtually all the effort is going. I would be willing to predict, on the other hand, 
that the next major earthquake in Japan is not going to be in the Tokai area. I think 
that their scientific community and theV political leaders are likely to find 
themselves in some trouble as a result. Although scientists in Japan may appear 
unified, I'm not sure that's entirely desirable. I would argue that the various 
voices we are hearing in this country on the prediction problem, as well as on other 
aspects of hazard reduction, are in fact beneficial to the long-term solution of the 
earthquake problem. 
Andrews: Let me ask you a question, Clarence. What would you say is the 
responsibility of an individual scientist in the event that there is a statement from 
the California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council regarding a consensus 
that's been reached about an event that's expected within I 0 days? What is the 
responsibility of other members of the scientific community. Should they comment 
on that publicly? And what role do you think they should play? 
Allen: Well, I agree that they have to be very careful. The memberships of 
both the State and the National councils have been chosen to represent a wide 
spectrum of scientific opinion. If those councils come out with a judgement that 
represents a relatively unanimous opinion, then I think scientists have to be very 
carefu I in the statements they make. On the other hand, I see no reason for not 
offering criticism. I don't think it's necessarily irresponsible to offer criticism 
providing one does it in a way that allows one's opinions to be tested publicly. But I 
would certainly agree with you that once there seems to be a consensus, then one 
has to be careful as to what one says. 
I'm intrigued by your response that the magnitude 6.5 prediction will be 
better than the probabilistic statement. I'm not really sure I agree with you. I 
think that from the point of view of building codes and land-use planning over the 
next 50 years along the Newport-Inglewood fault and the adjacent parts of Los 
Angeles, a correct probabilistic assessment of what's going to happen on that fault 
in the next 50 years might be more beneficial to the citizens of this city than the 
prediction of an event two weeks from now, which is going to be hard to prepare 
for anyway. 
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Andrews: Again, I think we come down to a basic conflict of responsibilities to 
the many thousands of people that may be killed in that magnitude 6.5 event on the 
Newport-Inglewood fault. I think that the only thing they would be reminded of is 
the economist's statement that in the long run we are all dead anyway. In the short 
run, it is the problem that we would need to focus on and if we're talking about an 
event that could result in 35 or 40 billion dollars in property losses and tens of 
thousands of people being killed I think that, again, I would bet on the short-term 
prediction even recognizing that it would create tremendous problems. 
Allen: How is the prediction going to save that 35 billion dollars? 
Andrews: It's probably not. 
Allen: What is the value of two week's lead notice? 
Andrews: It will save lives; it has the potential of saving lives. 
Allen: On the other hand, the long-term prediction might well save a large 
part of that 35 billion dollars, as well as many lives in the future. 
Andrews: I hope that those aren't the type of binary choices that we're facing in 
all of this. Again I would say a SO-year probabilistic statement in some ways begs 
the fundamental question.' 
Allen: It's not really a choice of one to the exclusion of the other. The 
scientific efforts we're making towards trying to predict earthquakes are based 
upon identifying physical precursors for short- and medium-term predictions. In 
terms of hazard evaluation, we're looking at sequences of past earthquakes and 
probabilistic approaches. So to some degree the choice we have to make is about 
where to spend our money: how much should be put into earthquake prediction 
versus hazard evaluation? I think this is a serious and difficult question. 
Andrews: If I had to make the choice it would be on the development of those 
kind of data that can help us in the long run reduce the overall seismic hazard. 
Earthquake prediction alone is not going to help solve the complex problems that 
are involved in seismic safety in California or elsewhere. I don't think our debate 
should be over how we divide up what is already a very small pie. We ought to be 
making a case of why we need to increase the overall level of effort and resources 
that are devoted to this problem. Many resources have to come from here in 
California because the problem is both a State problem and a local government 
problem. I think we have taken steps in the last few years to provide a certain kind 
of independence in California for the programs that we're involved with. And we 
need to continue that because I don't think the earthquake solution can be driven 
solely by Federal priorities and Federal funding. 
45 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION AND HAZARDS EVALUATION 
IN THE YEAR 2000 - DISCUSSION 
This session was moderated by Walter W. Hays. Those commenting were 
Clarence R. Allen, Richard A. Andrews, Valerie R. Kockelman, Anthony 
Prud'homme, James E. Slosson, James J. Watkins, Edward M. O'Connor, Rachel M. 
Gulliver, Gary C. Hart, and others who were not identified. The following was 
transcribed, condensed, and edited from audiotapes by William M. Brown Ill. 
Valerie l<ockelman thought that the public should be made aware of any 
earthquake prediction, thereby being given a choice about what actions to take. 
Allen agreed, suggesting that scientific predictors take a realistic point of view: if 
they tried to keep a prediction secret, that would almost guarantee that it would 
not be a secret. 
Prud'homme expressed concern that the dialogue had focused almost 
exclusively on earthquake prediction, and called for more attention to preparedness 
planning. Given that there will be a major earthquake in southern California, 
concerted efforts should be made throughout the community to deal with hazardous 
buildings, nonstructural hazards, and emergency planning. Prud'homme felt that 
earthquake prediction was almost irrelevant, and that the focus should be on 
retrofitting buildings and educating the public about the inevitable earthquake. 
Andrews noted that the focus on prediction arose from the topic he was asked 
to address, but in general agreed with Prud'homme about a comprehensive, 
balanced approach to the earthquake problem. Andrews felt that the basic issue is 
the question of time, and quoted Paul Flores: "Quite simply, in Mexico City, the 
preparedness time ran out." Andrews described the phased approach to earthquake 
preparedness, noting that constructing earthquake-resistant buildings is a long-
term solution. In the interim, however, cost-effective ways must be found to 
reduce the loss of life and property. Perhaps earthquake prediction fits into the 
interim strategy of preparedness. 
Allen argued that recognizing the earthquake threat and preparing for it is 
not the whole answer. Engineers need to know which earthquake (magnitude, 
intensity, and local geology) to incorporate into their designs. For example, in the 
cases of the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear power plants, strong earthquake 
shaking has been designed for. The problem becomes one of designing those plants 
for appropriate levels of public safety. The appropriate level of shaking for that 
particular design is determined by geotechnical investigation. 
Slosson noted that political perceptions about earthquake prediction were 
used to resist the implementation of a building strengthening ordinance for the 
City of Los Angeles. Because earthquake prediction technology seemed imminent, 
politicians argued against moving rapidly on the proposed ordinance on the basis 
that evacuation was less costly than strengthening. Slosson saw reliance on 
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prediction technology by politicians as an excuse for not making unpopular 
decisions. 
Watkins noted scientists have forecast a probable catastrophic earthquake in 
southern California within the next 20 to 30 years, yet public officials are not 
taking appropriate action. Therefore, neither earthquake predictions nor 
probabilistic statements seem to be the proper motivators for comprehensive 
preparedness. 
Allen suggested that the 1985 Mexico earthquake did motivate action in 
southern California. It was no accident that the Huntington-Sheraton Hotel in 
Pasadena, California was declared unsafe shortly after the Mexico earthquake. 
Also, a report on hazardous buildings on the University of California at Los Angeles 
campus was released, and the building strengthening program of the City of Los 
Angeles was accelerated immediately after the Mexico earthquake. 
Andrews also expressed optimism about the political process with respect to 
earthquake safety. Although not all earthquake-safety-related bills presented by 
the California Legislature have been signed into law, none have been dismissed out 
of hand, and most of the unsuccessful bills were not signed for very good reasons. 
Andrews felt inactivity on the part of local government in earthquake preparedness 
was abetted by difficult political and economic issues. Andrews thought that 
programs to strengthen buildings would be more successful if there were a clearer 
indication of the time available before the next potentially catastrophic 
earthquake. A high degree of uncertainty about the time of its occurrence, with 
some projections placing it as far in the future as year 2225, obviates political or 
economic reasons to take rapid action on strengthening or rebuilding programs. 
Allen, referring to Slosson's comments, agreed that politicians might rely on 
earthquake prediction as an easy solution to their preparedness problems. To some 
degree, however, scientists are responsible for that attitude because they were 
unduly optimistic a decade ago about predicting earthquakes. Currently, if 
scientists were to go before governmental bodies and say earthquakes cannot be 
predicted, it would be difficult to get those officials to believe them. 
An unidentified participant expressed great concern about the consequences 
of predicting an earthquake that does not occur. Politicians do not look forward to 
being involved in the disruptions resulting from an earthquake prediction for a 
populated area. The consequences of possible evacuation, suspended economic 
activity, and similar problems may prevent politicians from taking strong, 
concerted action. 
O'Connor speaking from his experience as a pioneer in prompting the 
strengthening of existing buildings, urged the scientific community to press for 
strengthening programs. Otherwise, decisions about strengthening are commonly 
left to the building official, who might not be willing to take the pressure of 
forcing owners to strengthen or rebui Id their properties. 
Gulliver asked about the prospects for dealing with hazardous structures 
other than unreinforced masonry buildings. These include tilt-up buildings, mid-
rise reinforced concrete structures, structures with "soft" first stories, and certain 
single-column bridges. 
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Hart replied by referring to improperly framed 6- and 12-story buildings. In 
practice, Hart found that building owners generally will not review the earthquake 
safety of their buildings unless forced to do so by law. Hart recommended that the 
law require building owners to have earthquake-hazards reports prepared for their 
buildings, and that these reports be made public. If a report is prepared, and is not 
made public, then the effectiveness of that report is lost. The procedure is mainly 
a political one, and it should somehow be applied to all major construction types 
mentioned by Gulliver. 
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